senator erwin tulfo

“IF THE purpose of American military bases is to strengthen American military posture in the Pacific, or in the Indian Ocean and throughout the world, does this not expose the Philippines to the animosities, suspicions, and conflicts arising out of this American military buildup— animosities and conflicts that we have no participation in making? And do not these bases endanger the safety of the Filipinos and the Philippines not only from conventional armed attack, but from possible nuclear attack?” — President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos Sr. 

When great powers expand wars, smaller states connected to their military infrastructure discover a harsh geopolitical truth: alliances do not eliminate danger but often relocate it. For the Philippines, this reality is becoming increasingly urgent. The rapid expansion of U.S. military access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) risks transforming the archipelago into a forward operating platform in Washington’s next major conflict in Asia. 

In an era of long-range missiles, drone warfare, and precision strike systems, such positioning does not necessarily strengthen deterrence. It may instead place Philippine territory on the targeting maps of adversaries. 

Recent events in the Middle East should serve as a warning. On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched large-scale military strikes against Iran, hitting strategic sites in Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, and other cities. 

Iranian retaliation extended beyond Israeli territory to U.S. military facilities and allied states hosting American forces. The crisis quickly spilled into the Strait of Hormuz, where 20% of the world’s oil trade takes place. Shipping traffic was disrupted, halting the flow of millions of barrels of oil daily. The Iranians have also announced their closure. 

According to analysis from the Geopolitical Economy Report, the widening war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran did not emerge in isolation. 

The conflict is rooted in a long trajectory of escalating pressure on Tehran following Washington’s withdrawal in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral nuclear agreement signed in 2015. 

Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeatedly confirmed that Iran was complying with the agreement’s restrictions on nuclear activities. 

Yet Washington abandoned the deal and pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign centered on sanctions, economic warfare, and military pressure. 

That escalation eventually spilled into open military confrontation. 

As reported by the same analysis, the conflict quickly expanded beyond isolated strikes to involve a broader regional confrontation. 

Iran responded using a military doctrine built around ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drone systems capable of striking U.S. military facilities and allied infrastructure across the region.

The result was a widening conflict affecting multiple countries hosting American forces, threatening shipping routes, and destabilizing energy markets tied to the Persian Gulf. A report by PBS NewsHour revealed that several Gulf allies were frustrated after the United States launched strikes on Iran without prior notification, leaving countries hosting American forces exposed when Iran retaliated with missiles and drones across the region. The lesson is straightforward: when the United States enters a major war, the geography of that war expands to include the locations where American forces operate. 

Which brings us to our beloved motherland. 

Under EDCA, the United States has gained access to nine locations across the country, allowing rotational troop deployments, construction of military facilities, and the prepositioning of equipment inside Philippine bases. 

These sites include locations such as Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Lumbia Air Base in Cagayan de Oro, and additional facilities in northern Luzon facing Taiwan and the South China Sea. 

Philippine officials maintain that these are not U.S. bases but Philippine facilities used for joint cooperation with American forces. 

Legally, that distinction exists. 

Practically, it may matter far less. 

If such logic applies in the Gulf, why would it not apply in the Pacific? 

To a rival state calculating retaliatory strike options during a conflict, a facility hosting U.S. military assets or supporting American operations becomes part of the battlefield regardless of its legal ownership. 

In modern warfare, adversaries do not distinguish between sovereignty and treaty ally alignment. They simply neutralize targets that support enemy military capabilities. This is why calls to reassess EDCA deserve serious consideration. 

In early March, Senator Erwin Tulfo called for a review of the agreement, warning that the Philippines could become a target if the United States became involved in major conflicts abroad. 

Tulfo specifically pointed to the Middle East crisis, noting how American military installations overseas often become immediate targets when war breaks out. If such facilities exist within Philippine territory, nearby communities could face similar risks. 

This concern reflects a fundamental reality of modern warfare. 

Large-scale conflicts today rarely begin with conventional invasions. 

They begin with precision missile strikes designed to cripple military infrastructure within minutes.

Airfields, bases, missile systems, and radar installations are targeted to degrade an adversary’s operational capacity before ground forces even move. 

If EDCA locations function as staging grounds for U.S. military operations, then they become prime targets in the opening phase of any major war involving Washington. Supporters of EDCA argue that such arrangements strengthen deterrence against China in the West Philippine Sea. 

But deterrence works only when it reduces the probability of conflict. 

If the Philippines becomes deeply embedded in a great-power military architecture aimed at containing China, the country may instead find itself on the front line of a future confrontation. This is exactly why diplomacy remains indispensable. 

The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has recently emphasized its role as the Philippines’ authoritative voice on regional and international issues. 

The newly appointed DFA spokesperson for Maritime Affairs, Rogelio Villanueva Jr., has stressed that diplomacy and dialogue remain essential tools in managing tensions, particularly in complex disputes such as the South China Sea. 

At the same time, the Philippine government has continued maintaining diplomatic channels with Beijing. 

In early March, Philippine officials held discussions with the Chinese envoy in Manila, reaffirming commitments to communication and peaceful engagement despite ongoing maritime tensions. 

The DFA has also defended its diplomatic approach to managing incidents in the West Philippine Sea. 

Responding to critics of a provisional understanding between the Philippines and China aimed at preventing confrontations at the Ayungin Shoal, the department pointed out that some critics had attacked the agreement without even seeing its contents, emphasizing that diplomacy seeks to prevent escalation and miscalculation. 

These diplomatic efforts have not been universally welcomed. 

An analyst has argued that excessive reliance on quiet diplomacy risks normalizing coercive actions by China in disputed waters. He warns that Manila must remain firm in asserting its rights under the 2016 arbitral ruling that invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. 

But framing diplomacy as weakness misunderstands the complex dilemma facing the Philippines. 

The country must pursue two objectives simultaneously. 

First, it must defend its sovereignty and maritime rights. 

Second, it must prevent the archipelago from becoming a battlefield in a war between major powers.

These goals are complementary. 

A nation cannot protect its sovereignty if it is drawn into a catastrophic war that devastates its cities, infrastructure, and economy. 

Nor can diplomacy succeed if the country becomes militarily entangled in a geopolitical confrontation not of its own making. 

The widening war in the Middle East demonstrates how quickly such confrontations can spiral. As highlighted by the Geopolitical Economy Report, conflicts involving U.S. strategic interests often expand across multiple regions and actors once hostilities begin. 

Military escalation between Iran, Israel, and the United States has already produced ripple effects across energy markets, shipping routes, and regional security systems. The Philippines should study these developments carefully. 

Countries that host foreign military assets often discover that they inherit not only the perceived benefits of alliance but also the dangers of retaliation. 

When a superpower’s military infrastructure exists inside your borders, your territory inevitably becomes part of the wider battlefield. 

This is the geopolitical trap facing Manila. 

The Philippines should maintain alliances and partnerships. But those relationships must serve Philippine interests first, not subordinate them to the military objectives of another superpower. A sovereign nation must retain the ability to pursue diplomacy, de-escalation, and regional cooperation without automatically being drawn into military confrontations between larger states. 

We should avoid the risk of becoming a frontline. 

The archipelago sits in one of the most strategically important areas in the Asia-Pacific, connecting the South China Sea, the Philippine Sea, and other critical maritime trade routes. In the event of a major conflict between the United States and China, military planners on both sides would view Philippine territory as a crucial theater. 

And in modern war, crucial theaters become targets. 

This is why the debate over EDCA must move beyond slogans about alliances and accusations of malign foreign influence. 

It is fundamentally a question of national survival. 

The Philippines must ask itself whether expanding foreign military access strengthens the country’s long-term security or whether it quietly places Philippine cities, ports, and airfields onto the strike lists of future wars. 

History shows that when great powers fight, geography becomes destiny.

The Philippines must ensure that its geography does not become someone else’s battlefield.

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Daniel Long is an entrepreneurship student at Thames International and a Filipino writer contributing to the Asian Century Journal and The Manila Times. He is also a guest host of the “PH-China Talks” radio program on DWAD 1098 and a Youth Committee member of the Association for Philippines–China Understanding (APCU). He previously served as a speechwriter for Senator Imee Marcos and has represented the Philippines as a press and APCU delegate to China.