TO DOMINATE supply chains, the Trump administration is weaponizing the global AI race. Instead of learning from atomic regulation, the administration is setting the stage for catastrophic risks.
Anthropic’s IPO filing on Monday set the stage for the Claude creator to pursue possibly the largest initial stock offering in history. Yet, Anthropic acknowledged, “It could pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity.”
On September 29, President Trump convened the CEOs of the leading U.S. AI companies, who announced a voluntary “Joint Commitment on Frontier Responsibilities.” But since it is not legally enforceable, it is neither “morally binding” nor a “constitution” for AI safety.
The AI giants being asked to police AI admit that increasingly autonomous systems can behave in ways their creators did not anticipate. Yet, they are promoting the unpredictable products within the US military-industrial complex. The net effect? A historical acceleration of existential risks.
Weaponizing U.S. technological primacy
Trump has repeatedly framed AI as a competition between the United States and China. He has rejected cooperation with Beijing because he believes the US is already leading. The administration is constructing an AI-national-security-industrial complex.
In January, War Secretary Pete Hegseth issued the Pentagon’s milestone AI memorandum, which laid out a plan with a drastic focus on acceleration, not deceleration. “Speed wins,” Hegseth wrote.
In spring, according to CNN, a U.S. Special Operations Command analyst used a large language model that almost misled the U.S. into instigating a war with China.
And yet, the June 2026 national security memorandum directed the U.S. national security establishment to obtain the most advanced AI systems, rapidly integrate commercial and open-source models, build high-security computing infrastructure, and establish a strategic reserve of AI expertise.
The military-led objective is a “decisive and enduring AI advantage” over adversaries.
AI ecosystem is already transnational
Washington is unwilling to impose rules that might slow U.S. companies while China continues developing its own ecosystem—even at the risk of accelerating catastrophic risks.
The problem is that AI is already transnational.
American companies depend upon global supply chains; advanced chips involve Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Europe. Models circulate globally. Open-source weights cross borders instantly. Researchers move internationally. Cyber vulnerabilities are inherently transnational. And AI systems increasingly interact with infrastructure belonging to other countries.
China’s 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan explicitly calls for international cooperation, safety, controllability, and inclusive participation. Europe’s EU AI Act imposes obligations on general-purpose models and substantially stronger requirements on models classified as presenting systemic risk.
The international community cannot accept an exclusively U.S.-controlled AI order. Instead, what is needed is international multilateral cooperation.
The military-civilian debate over atomic regulation
Following the success of the Manhattan Project, a fierce debate erupted over the military and civilian architects on who should control the newly unlocked power of the atom. General Leslie Groves, who directed the Manhattan Project, championed military retention, while J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project’s Los Alamos Laboratory, and a coalition of scientists fiercely advocated for civilian governance.
Groves’s stated priority was national security. He and the War Department believed that maintaining strict military secrecy and keeping custody of the weapons stockpile was essential to deter foreign adversaries.
By contrast, Oppenheimer insisted on civilian leadership. As scientists, Oppenheimer and his peers knew that the atom held significant dual-use potential. Atomic energy had immense civilian potential for medical research, electric power, and peaceful scientific progress.
Finally, the scientists believed in international cooperation. In their view, a military-run agency would make international arms control and treaties structurally impossible.
Atomic and AI Regulation: existential lessons and risks
Like nuclear power, AI is dual-use technology. While it powers autonomous weapons, it also drives medical breakthroughs, consumer software, and economic growth. Restricting AI entirely to a national security framework risks strangling open innovation and commercial progress. But unlike the 1940s, the state does not own the technology; private corporations do.
Hence, the effort of the Trump administration and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to push for a military/national security overview. The two seek to filter AI governance through a hyper-accelerated national security lens, as evidenced by the establishment of the four-star Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM). The logic centers on three tenets.
First, the “wartime speed” race against China. Second, hostility toward private sector “guardrails”: When AI firms like Anthropic refused to strip out safety guardrails that prevent their models (such as Claude) from being integrated into fully autonomous offensive drones or surveillance tools, Hegseth designated them as blacklisted.
Finally, bypassing domestic regulatory agendas: By framing AI primarily as an asset of national survival and weaponization, the administration shifts the center of gravity away from civilian federal agencies (like the FTC or DOJ) and places it into the hands of military and intelligence entities.
How 2026 is falling behind 1946
In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, civilian leadership won the battle for control of the atom. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) established the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under strict civilian authority, dealing a heavy blow to the Pentagon’s initial plans.
There were three reasons for the civilian triumph. Oppenheimer and the newly formed Federation of Atomic Scientists engaged in a smart, coordinated public relations and congressional lobbying campaign, framing atomic energy as a turning point for humanity, not just a military asset. Second, they were supported by congressional skepticism of military monopoly. Finally, even President Truman supported civilian control.
Unfortunately, AI regulation is unlikely to benefit from similar tailwinds.
Today, the leading AI scientists operate in the corporate sector, not in the public realm. Second, decades of forever wars have dramatically transformed Capitol Hill due to the increasing share of congressional members with military, intelligence, and security backgrounds whose campaigns rely on financial contributions by the military-industrial complex.
To make things even more challenging, the Trump administration, blinded by faded fantasies of U.S. unipolar primacy in an increasingly multipolar world, rejects the idea of civilian control.
And so, the scene is set for catastrophic risks—in the name of national security.
Dr Dan Steinbock is the founder of Difference Group and has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institute for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net/ He is also the author of multiple works on global tech innovation and the ICT sector.
